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Résumé: Nous proposons un modèle d'apprentissage informel qui identifie deux des principales 
composantes de la formation en entreprise : l'apprentissage autonome et l'apprentissage par 
observation des autres. En reliant les gains au potentiel d'apprentissage dans l'entreprise, celui-ci révise 
la modélisation classique de l'ancienneté (Mincer et Jovanovic, 1981). L'estimation des paramètres 
structurels de ce modèle non-linéaire, à l'aide de données appariées françaises, fait apparaître, qu'en 
moyenne, les salariés peuvent apprendre l'équivalent de dix pour cent de leur capital humain initial et 
qu'il leur faut deux ans pour acquérir la moitié de ce potentiel d'apprentissage. Le potentiel 
d'apprentissage des individus dans leur établissement permet, à la fois au niveau des emplois et des 
établissements, de distinguer un secteur primaire (à forte accumulation en capital humain) d'un secteur 
secondaire (à faible accumulation en capital humain). Nous montrons qu'il existe une forte corrélation 
entre le potentiel d'apprentissage et l'ancienneté. Les prédictions de la théorie duale du marché du 
travail concernant l'appariement positif entre secteur primaire et salariés les plus éduqués, visibles au 
niveau des établissements, semble disparaître au niveau des emplois. 
 
Mots clés: Capital humain, fonctions de gains, formation informelle, apprentissage par observation 
des autres, apprentissage autonome, rendements de l'ancienneté, dualisme. 
 
Abstract: A simple model of informal learning on-the-job which combines learning by oneself and 
learning from others is proposed in this paper. It yields a closed-form solution that revises Mincer-
Jovanovic’s (1981) treatment of tenure in the human capital earnings function by relating earnings to 
the individual’s learning potential from jobs and firms. We estimate the structural parameters of this 
non-linear model on a large French survey with matched employer-employee data. We find that 
workers on average can learn from others ten percent of their own human capital on entering the firm, 
and catch half of their learning potential in just two years. The measurement of workers’ learning 
potential in their jobs and establishments provides a simple characterization of primary-type and 
secondary-type jobs and establishments. We find a strong relationship between the job-specific 
learning potential and tenure. Predictions of dual labor market theory regarding the positive match of 
primary-type firms (which offer high learning opportunities) with highly endowed workers (educated, 
high wages) are visible at the establishment level but seem to vanish at the job's level. 
 
Keywords: Human capital, earnings functions, informal training, learning from others, learning by 
oneself, returns to tenure, dualism. 
 
JEL Code: J24, J31, I2. 
 
 
2
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The effects of human capital on earnings are commonly captured by a remarkably 
simple equation, which was suggested and estimated by Mincer (1974) on US Census data 
and is still known as the “Mincerian” earnings function. The most widely estimated version of 
this model is linear in education and quadratic in labor market experience: it is usually called 
the quadratic earnings function. An extended version of this equation, which was proposed by 
Mincer and Jovanovic (1981), also includes a quadratic function of tenure in the incumbent 
firm. This typical equation has now been estimated so many times, in so many countries, and 
fits the data so parsimoniously with satisfactory results, that there have been incredibly few 
attempts to improve its theoretical underpinnings. However, Mincer (1974) was aware that the 
description of post-school investment was the weak point of his theoretical construction: 
 
“[…] the most important and urgent task is to refine the specification of the post-school investment 
category […] to include details (variables) on a number of forms of investment in human capital.” 
 
Mincer (1974) was conscious that a variety of learning processes took place within 
firms, but he was severely constrained by the available data sets at the time he wrote. As it 
stands, the Mincerian earnings function incorporates some of the major implications of 
optimal human capital models but it does not derive from the worker’s optimizing behavior 
described by these models, since the investment profiles are assumed exogenously. 
Furthermore, and this is perhaps even more disquieting, it treats human investments in school 
and on-the-job exactly alike. However, in contrast to investments in schooling, the supply of 
informal training is tied into the workers' labor contract. As Rosen (1972) remarked long ago, 
each firm provides a specific package of training services to its workers so that the latter, once 
they entered a firm, have no other choice than to acquire its knowledge. The time has come to 
think of incorporating the informal diffusion of knowledge within firms into the Mincerian 
earnings function because large matched employer-employee data sets are now available 
(Abowd and Kramarz, 1999). We shall be using here a unique French survey on labor cost 
and wages structure (INSEE 1992) comprising 150 000 wage earners in 16 000 
establishments. On the theoretical side, we explicitly model two informal learning processes 
on-the-job in an attempt to capture both unsystematic and systematic components. We 
designate the unsystematic part as “self-learning” and the systematic part as “learning by 
watching” or “learning from others”. Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989) confirms the 
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importance of these informal learning processes in the U.S. In the three months following the 
recruitment of new workers, 96% of on-the-job training is given to them in an informal way 
by other workers (145.2 hours of a total 151.1 hours) and more than one-third of on-the-job 
training (53.1 hours) is provided through a “learning by watching” process. Learning by 
oneself through experience and learning from others seem to capture the essential ingredients 
of informal learning on-the-job, so that a model that incorporates these two elements should 
offer a good description of informal on-the-job training. They both form the microeconomic 
counterparts of the autonomous and catch-up growth processes separated by Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994) in macroeconomic growth models, following a suggestion of Nelson and 
Phelps (1966). We extend here the model of learning by watching presented by Lévy-Garboua 
(1994), by incorporating self-learning. Previous tests of the learning-by-watching model on 
various data sets have appeared in Chennouf, Lévy-Garboua et Montmarquette (1997), 
Nordman (2000), and Destré (2000). This paper presents the first test of the extended model 
of earnings on a large data set. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. After presenting the model in section 2, the data 
and the econometric approach are discussed in section 3. Section 4 discusses the main results, 
and section 5 concludes.  
 
 
II. A MODEL OF ON-THE-JOB LEARNING 
 
Workers may acquire training formally or informally. Both kinds of training are costly 
as they take time away from more productive tasks. The main difference between them seems 
to be that purely informal learning, unlike formal training, does not consume any resources 
from other workers1. As a result, employees who are getting or supplying informal training 
may not always be conscious that they are doing so2. Workers learn informally on-the-job, 
either by themselves (i.e. through their own experience) or by watching others. “Self-
learning” on-the-job enhances productivity by a trial-and-error process, and the productivity 
gain should be highly correlated with human capital since the more qualified workers are 
                                                          
1 Like formal training, informal training consumes non-labor resources of the firm. When non-labor costs can be 
neglected, informal training is freely supplied by firms if workers under training pay for the foregone value of 
their own time. 
2 This is consistent with the finding (Barron, Black and Berger, 1997) that employees underestimate the amount 
of informal training they received by 20% relative to employers. 
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likely to adopt innovations faster. “Watching” the more productive workers do their own job 
also enhances the productivity of a less productive worker by a simple imitation process, at no 
cost for her “teachers”. This is a kind of externality which, for two main reasons, does not call 
for a direct compensation of the teachers. First, it is a diffuse process in which many teachers 
may interact with many students without even realizing that they supply training services, as 
they suffer no cost. Second, today’s students will normally become tomorrow’s teachers and 
so repay what they received in the past. 
 
A. A gross earnings function 
 
Wage rates are assumed to equal the value of marginal product of labor on a 
competitive market. Thus, gross earnings reflect human capital. Let us designate tenure in the 
incumbent firm as t, expressed in discrete time, and human capital by the end of period t as ht. 
With these notations, h0 represents the level of human capital on entering the firm, that is after 
x periods of experience on the labor market in other firms. Total experience of work is x+t. 
Worker i interacts with other workers from the same firm j but she learns only from those who 
possess more human capital than herself. Let Hijt be the highest level of human capital 
embodied in an employee that she is exposed to and can learn from in the same firm. It 
summarizes the firm’s knowledge as far as worker i is concerned. By definition, Hijt≥hijt. For 
the ease of exposition, the worker’s index i and the firm's index j will be omitted when this 
raises no confusion. The combined effects of own experience and learning from others on a 
worker’s productivity in period t are assumed additive in the small and given by: 
 
(1) ( )1111 1 −−−− −++=− ttttt hHn
nghhh  
 
In this equation, the effect of self-learning is proportional to the stock of human capital 
when the period begins. The factor g is net of the physical depreciation rate of human capital 
and it is assumed to be constant. It might be negative if the rate of depreciation exceeded the 
constant rate of self-learning, but we expect it to be normally positive. While experience tends 
to increase the human capital of all workers at a constant rate, the presence of others is 
presumably more beneficial to less qualified workers who have a lot to learn, if n (n>0), the 
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rate of knowledge diffusion within the firm, is identical for all workers. For simplicity, this 
assumption will be kept here3. Moreover, n is invariant with respect to tenure.  
 
We can now solve the recurrence equation  (1) after postulating that the structure of 
knowledge (human capital) and the diffusion process within the firm are time-invariant. We 
first rewrite: 
 
(2) 11 11
1
−− ++


++= ttt Hn
nh
n
gh  
 
If g=0, i.e. in the pure learning-by-watching case studied by Lévy-Garboua (1994), ht 
is simply a weighted average of ht-1 and Ht-1. Moreover, the firm's job-specific knowledge is 
time-invariant (i.e. HH t =−1 ) because the most qualified worker in this job category can 
learn neither from experience nor from others. In this case, the human capital of a worker 
increases with tenure and converges towards the firm's job-specific knowledge:  
 
(3) ( ) ( ) Hnhnh ttt 



+−++= 1
11
1
1
0  
 
with H≥h0. 
 
In the general case (g≠0), when self-learning and learning from others combine, ht is 
not a weighted average of ht-1 and Ht-1: the total of their coefficients is 1+g. Putting this total 
in factor, we derive from  (2): 
 
(4) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) 


+++++
+++= −− 11 1111
111 ttt Hng
nh
ng
nggh  
 
                                                          
3 This is actually not a serious problem if we hypothesize that the rate of knowledge diffusion depends solely on 
the schooling level, which remains constant over lifetime. This is indeed a plausible assumption because it is the 
role of education to enhance the ability to learn, not that of on-the-job training. Damoiselet and Lévy-Garboua 
(2000) develop a theory of educational systems based on this distinction. 
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The term in brackets is now a weighted average of ht-1 and Ht-1, which looks again like 
the pure learning by watching case. However, the firm's job-specific knowledge now grows 
with experience if the distribution of knowledge is maintained constant within the firm: 
 
(5) ( ) 11 −+= tt HgH  
 
with ht≤Ht  ∀t≥0. By recurrence, we derive from  (4) and  (5) the general solution of equation 
(1): 
 
(6) ( ) ttmttt Hkhkh −+= 1  
 
with:  
 
(7) ( ) 01 HgH tt +=   ;  ( ) 01 hgh tmt +=   and  ( )( )( )ng
ngk ++
++=
11
11  
 
In  (6) and  (7), mth  designates the value of gross earnings predicted by a linear-in-
tenure version of the Mincerian earnings function. Equation  (6) nests equation  (3), if g=0. The 
human capital of any given worker increases with tenure and converges towards the firm's 
job-specific knowledge. However, the latter is a moving target, which increases at a steady 
rate.  
 
B. The returns to tenure 
 
The (gross) marginal returns to tenure for a worker i employed in firm j (Rijt) are easily 
derived from  (1) for t≥1: 
 



 −++=
−=
−
−
−
− 1
1 1,
1,
1,
1,
tij
tij
tij
tijijt
ijt h
H
n
ng
h
hh
R  
 
and  (6) readily yields: 
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t
ijt
m
it
ijt
ijt k
H
h
H
h



 −+= 11  
 
Equation  (7) shows that: 
 
(8) ij
i
ij
m
ijt
ijt
h
H
h
H λ+≡= 1
0
0  
 
where λij≥0 designates the job-specific learning (from others) potential, which is independent 
of tenure. After simple manipulations, we get for t≥1: 
 
(9) ( )



−+++= −
−
1
1
111 tij
t
ij
ijt k
k
n
ngR λ
λ
 
 
This equation highlights that one part of the returns to tenure is firm dependent4. A 
worker benefits from the firm which employs her, in addition to what she gets from 
experience, insofar she can learn something from other workers in her job category. This 
prediction of the model extends one part of the dual theory story that tells that the returns to 
tenure are nil in secondary-type jobs, in which practically no human capital accumulation 
takes place, while they are positive in primary-type jobs (Dickens and Lang, 1985). Indeed, 
(9) indicates that the returns to tenure are minimal and reduce to g whenever λij=0, i.e. 
Hij0=hi0, that is when there is no scope for learning from others on-the-job. Moreover, in the 
present model, the crucial distinction between primary-type jobs and secondary-type jobs 
does not bear on their respective levels of human capital but on the relative knowledge of the 
firm from the standpoint of each worker. The latter is obviously idiosyncratic, depending 
upon the tasks to be performed and personal abilities.  
 
The marginal returns to tenure are shown by equation (9) to be a concave increasing 
function of the job-specific learning potential: 
 
                                                          
4 We avoid to say here that returns to tenure are firm-specific because what we have to say is entirely consistent 
with general training. 
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2
2
<∂
∂>∂
∂
ij
ijt
ij
ijt RR
λλ  
 
It is also straightforward to show that (9) exhibits a convex decreasing relation of the 
marginal return to tenure with tenure: 
 
0
 
 
                                              0
 
 
2
2
>∂
∂<∂
∂
t
R
t
R ijtijt  
 
The quadratic earnings function implies a linearly decreasing curve. Thus, it is not 
supported by what seems a reasonable description of informal learning processes at work on-
the-job. Mincer (1974) remarked that a Gompertz curve might yield a better fit than the 
simple quadratic function. More recently, Murphy and Welch (1990) noticed that the 
quadratic curve underestimates the marginal return to tenure at low and very high values of 
tenure, and they recommended a quartic earnings function. The steep decline of Rijt with 
tenure is responsible for the alternating sign of 
n
Rijt 
∂
∂
: initially positive at low values of tenure 
(including t=1), and eventually negative. Increasing the efficiency of learning on-the-job will 
benefit low-tenured workers who will learn faster, but it will reduce what remains to be 
learned from others in the future. 
 
Finally, it can be shown that: 
 
( ) 0  if  1  0  and  2 for  , 1
 
 ==≥≥≥∂
∂
ijij
ijt t
g
R λλ  
 
Increasing the efficiency of experience initially increases the self-learning effect but 
this will provoke a multiplier effect in subsequent periods by raising the firm's knowledge. 
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III. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
A. The data 
 
We use in this paper a unique French survey with matched employer-employee data, 
the 1992 INSEE survey on labor cost and wages structure. The latter contains information 
about 150 000 workers across 16 000 establishments.  
 
This survey of labor costs is carried out concurrently in all European Union countries 
every four years, and aims to provide comparable labor market statistics across EU countries. 
For the 1992 wave of this survey, INSEE matched the data with those on the structure of 
wages (as the subject matter of the two surveys was obviously similar). The population 
covered by these data is very broad, including establishments of all sizes and of all industries 
(which rules out agriculture, fisheries, non-traded services, central and local government). 
 
For the regression analysis, we constructed a certain number of variables. These 
include the total number of years of education, total potential experience in the labor market 
(age – number of years of education – six), hourly earnings (gross salary plus payments in 
kind, all divided by the number of paid hours over the year), and the average number of paid 
hours of training per worker in the establishment (the weighted average of the number of 
hours of paid training by worker by occupational category (executive or non-executive) 
divided by the total number of workers by occupational category). 
 
As for the education variable, since available information was the highest paper 
certificate held by the worker, we had to determine the theoretical number of years of 
education per worker. To do this, we calculated the median number of years of education 
(which is less sensitive to outliers) for each qualification considered, using a sub-sample of 
more than 8 000 workers from the same survey for whom the number of years of education 
was available. This indirect method for calculating the length of education has the advantage 
of partially removing the endogeneity of the education variable. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the acronyms and definitions of the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis, and provides descriptive statistics.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Symbol Definition Mean Min Max Standard 
Deviation
hijt Hourly earnings 69.48  29.00  395.83 39.49 
hoursi Number of hours paid work per year 1671.78  33   2310 585.46 
sexi 1 for men. 0 for women 0.60    
agei Age 37.68  16 65 10.30 
nati 1 if French. 0 otherwise 0.93    
mari 1 if married. 0 otherwise 0.61    
conti 1 if open-ended contract, 0 otherwise or no answer 0.86    
execi 1 if executive. 0 otherwise 0.11    
si Number of years of schooling 12.77  8 18 1.65 
xi Number of years of labor market experience (outside of the current 
establishment) 
9.27  0 49 8.72 
tij Number of years of tenure 9.27  0 46 8.84 
N Number of observations 137 211    
Sj Highest level of education among workers of the same establishment 14.26  10 18 1.92 
Xj Highest level of former experience among workers of the same establishment 26.88  0 49 9.34 
Tj Highest level of tenure among workers of the same establishment 16.58  0 46 10.32 
regj 1 if Paris. 0 otherwise 0.16    
sizej Size of the establishment 140.16    540.46 
unionj 1 if trade union representatives reported in the establishment, 0 otherwise 0.25    
evalj 1 if individual productivity evaluation procedures reported in the     
establishment, 0 otherwise 
0.20    
coopj 1 if cooperation among workers reported, 0 otherwise 0.49    
shiftj 1 if workers shifting to other jobs in the establishment reported, 0 otherwise 0.16    
wagindj 1 if wage increases reported as being mainly individualized, 0 otherwise 0.20    
twagindj 1 if tenure reported as being very important  for setting the individualized 
wage increase, 0 otherwise 
0.06    
pwagindj 1 if worker’s productivity gains reported as being very important for setting 
the individualized wage increase, 0 otherwise 
0.35    
trwagindj 1 if worker’s training efforts reported as being very important in setting the 
individualized wage increase, 0 otherwise 
0.08    
expwagindj 1 worker’s experience reported as being very important in setting the 
individualized wage increase, 0 otherwise 
0.16    
fortrainj Average annual hours of paid formal training per worker in the establishment 11.83  0 1748.37 53.73 
J Number of establishments 14 693    
 
B. Econometric specification 
 
For the purpose of econometric estimation, we report  (7) into  (6) and take natural 
logarithms. If g is small, we get: 
 
(10) ( )[ ]tijiijt kgthh −+++= 11logloglog 0 λ         
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The logarithm of gross earnings is simply the sum of a linear-in-tenure Mincerian 
earnings function and a correction factor. The latter describes the share of her job-specific 
learning potential captured by an individual after t periods of tenure. If what can be learned 
on-the-job in any given firm is but a small share of the worker’s initial stock of human capital, 
 (10) can be further simplified and approximated by: 
 
(11) )1(loglog 0
t
ijiijt kgthh −++= λ  
 
Equation  (11) further specifies the human capital earnings function by saying that each 
worker learns informally on-the-job both by herself and by watching others. These two effects 
can be identified. In the present paper, we shall use the same Mincerian earnings function, 
quadratic in experience and tenure, to estimate respectively the gross earnings (in logs) of 
worker i on entering the establishment j (hence, with zero tenure) 0ih , and of her most 
qualified teacher in the same establishment at that time 0ijH :  
 
(12) 254
2
32100 ),,(log ijijijijijijijijij TaTaXaXaSaaTXSH +++++= ,  
 
with a1, a2, 04 >a and a3, 05 <a , and 
 
(13) 232100 )0,,(log iiiijiii xaxasaatxsh +++=≡  
 
where ),,( ijiiij txsz ≡  and ),,( ijijijij TXSZ ≡ denote the human capital vectors of i and her 
most qualified teacher in establishment j. The latter specification assumes that the firm’s job-
specific knowledge can be approximately attributed to a fictitious worker endowed with Sij 
years of education, Xij years of experience in other firms, and Tij periods of tenure in the 
incumbent firm j, such that: Sij≥si, Xij≥xij, Tij≥0. This is the most qualified teacher of i in her 
job category.  
 
The teacher’s characteristics are unobservable in our data5, but we do observe the 
same variables on a random sample of employees from the same establishment. Since 
individuals can only learn from more qualified workers in the same job category, a minimal 
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assumption for recovering the unknown characteristics of worker i’s teacher on-the-job is to 
assume that they lie between the establishment’s maximum and individual values of the latter 
at some fixed relative position, then approximate the true maximum by the sample’s 
maximum. Letting ij
ji
j zZ ∈
= sup  be the maximum observable value for the characteristic z in 
the establishment’s  sample, we write: 
 
(14) ( ) ijzjzij zZZ ββ −+= 1     with    0≤βz≤1  
 
zβ indicates the relative distance which separates the average worker from her most 
qualified teacher. It takes a value of zero if there is no opportunity for learning and one if the 
most qualified teacher always coincides with the most qualified teacher of the establishment’s 
sample. In order to specify the earnings function  (10), we first derive the job-specific learning 
potential from  (8) by making use of expressions  (12) and  (13) for 0ijH and 0ih  respectively 
and reporting  (14) into  (12). When the learning potential is small, we can simplify this 
expression into: 
 
(15) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 22543
22
321
0
0
2
log
jtjtiijx
ijxijxijs
i
ij
ij
TaTaxxXa
xXaxXasSa
h
H
βββ
βββλ
++−+
−+−+−=≅
 
 
Reporting  (13) and  (15) into  (11), we then obtain for individual i in establishment j a 
non-linear gross earnings equation, to which we add an error term uijt: 
 
(16) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )( )
∑ ++








++
++−



++−+
−+−+−+
++++=
k
ijtijkk
t
jtjtiijx
ijxijxijs
ijiiiijt
uc
ng
ng
TaTaxxXa
xXaxXasSa
gtxaxasaah
ij
δ
βββ
βββ
11
111
2
log
22
543
22
321
2
3210
 
where cijk is a column vector of control variables and δk is a row vector of coefficients 
associated with each of these variables. We estimate  (16) using non-linear least squares 
(NLSQ). However, since we cannot be sure that the magnitude of the learning potential is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Such observation would require a description of student-teacher interactions within establishments. 
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small enough for this approximation to be valid, we also estimated the exact formula (not 
reported here). 
 
With cross-section data and a non-linear model, we cannot account for unobserved 
individual or firm heterogeneity in the manner of Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis and Troske 
(2000). Besides, the large number of establishments in our data set rules out the possibility of 
controlling for firm heterogeneity by introducing a dummy variable for each establishment 
into equation  (16). In order to temper the effects of unobserved individual and firm 
heterogeneity which might bias the estimated coefficients, we added a large number of control 
variables to our regression6. We checked that the latter capture a good deal of the 
establishment heterogeneity by estimating the quadratic-in-tenure earnings function, which is 
linear in its parameters, both with establishment fixed effects (without the controls) and with 
the controls only. The comparison of the marginal returns to education, former experience and 
tenure exhibited little difference between these two estimates. By adding the sample’s 
maximum values of education, former experience and tenure in the Mincerian equation-since 
they are included in the non-linear model-, these differences were further reduced (results not 
shown). 
 
                                                          
6 The control variables are: log hours and dummies for sex (women), occupation (non-executives) and region (all 
regions with the exception of Paris and its suburbs), three dummies for nationality (French), five dummies for 
marital status (married), three dummies for labor contract (open-ended contract), one dummy for the presence of 
trade union representatives in the establishment (no), three dummies for the presence of individual productivity 
evaluation procedures in the establishment (yes), four dummies for the presence of incentives for cooperation 
among co-workers, three dummies for the presence of systematic job turnover among workers of the 
establishment (no), five dummies for the degree to which wage increases are being individualized (little), five 
dummies for the importance of tenure for setting the individualized wage increase (none), five dummies for the 
importance of worker’s productivity gains for setting the individualized wage increase (very high), five dummies 
for the importance of worker’s training efforts for setting the individualized wage increase (average), five 
dummies for the importance of worker’s experience for setting the individualized wage increase (average), four 
dummies for average number of paid hours of formal training in the establishment over the past year (no hours of 
training), twelve industry dummies (traded services) and six establishment size dummies (less than 20 workers). 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
A. Gross Earnings Functions 
 
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters of the gross earnings function, in column 5, 
along with four other models of earnings. Three versions of the Mincerian model appear in 
the first three columns of the table: linear in tenure (column 1), quadratic in tenure (column 
2), and quartic in tenure (column 3). Moreover, the pure learning-by-watching model (LBW) 
is shown in column 4. All of the estimated Mincerian equations are linear in education and 
quadratic in former experience. The adjusted R2 is equal to 60.41% for our model. All of the 
main explanatory variables are significant at the one percent level in all equations. Among the 
Mincerian earnings functions, we confirm on the present data that the quartic function of 
tenure yields a better fit than the usual quadratic and the linear equation. Moreover, the 
function that incorporates learning from self and others (LSO, in column 5) clearly has a 
better fit than the two nested models of column 1 (n=0) or column 4 (g=0). Finally, the 
simpler version of LSO described by  (16) has been estimated in column (6). The 
approximation is shown to be valid since the structural parameters reported in columns (5) 
and (6) are remarkably similar. 
 
The omission of self-learning leads to a severe underestimation of the knowledge 
diffusion parameter, since n goes from 45.22% in column 5 to 5.75% in column 4. It is more 
intuitive to compare the time required for a worker to learn α % of the firm’s knowledge as 
far as she is concerned. This is easily derived from  (6) and  (7):  
 
( ) α−=−
−=


+
++ 1
1
11
00 hH
hH
n
ng tt
t
 
 
after solving for t. The results of these computations are given in table 3 for the two values 
α=50% and α=95%. There is a huge difference between the two models and the estimations 
yielded by the earnings function which incorporates both self-learning and learning-by-
watching make a lot more sense. On average, it takes 1.93 years for a worker to embody 50% 
of the most she can learn from her establishment, and 8.37 years to embody 95% of this total. 
Moreover, the average worker of our sample, who has 9.27 years of tenure, has already 
learned 96% of what she can learn from others. The omission of self-learning greatly  
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Table 2: Gross earnings functions (Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings)7 
 
Parameters  (1) 
Linear in t 
(2) 
Quadratic in t 
(3) 
Quartic in t 
(4) 
LBW1 
(5) 
LSO2  
(6) 
LSO2  
Coef. of si 0.05293a 
(0.00052) 
0.05283a 
(0.00052) 
0.05260a 
(0.00052) 
0.05841a 
(0.00056) 
0.06060a 
(0.00058) 
0.06055a 
(0.00058) 
Coef. of xi 0.01031a 
(0.00026) 
0.01013a 
(0.00026) 
0.01024a 
(0.00026) 
0,01635a 
(0.00056) 
0.01352a 
(0.00033) 
0.01357a 
(0.00033) 
Coef. of xi2 -0.00021a 
(8.40e-06) 
-0.00020a 
(8.39e-06) 
-0.00021a 
(8.38e-06) 
-0.00034a 
(0.00001) 
-0.00027a 
(9.69e-06) 
-0.00027a 
(9.69e-06) 
Coef. of tij  0.01992a 
(0.00028) 
0.03912a 
(0.00096) 
   
Coef. of tij2  -0.00022a 
(9.27e-06) 
-0.00243a 
(0.00011) 
   
Coef. of tij3   0.00008a 
(5.13e-06) 
   
Coef. of tij4   -9.70e-07a 
(7.18e-08) 
   
βs    0.38352a 
(0.01298) 
0.26172a 
(0.00805) 
0.26176a 
(0.00808) 
βx    0.95666a 
(0.02101) 
0.21489a 
(0.01202) 
0.21862a 
(0.01207) 
Coef. of Tij    0.02142a 
(0,00056) 
0.00377a 
(0.00030) 
0.00377a 
(0.00029) 
Coef. of Tij2    
 
-0.00036a 
(0.00001) 
-0.00007a 
(6.92e-06) 
-0.00007a 
(6.92e-06) 
n     
 
0.05755a 
(0.00197) 
0.45220a 
(0.03822) 
0.46631a 
(0.03826) 
g 0.01344a 
(0.00010) 
   0.01077a 
(0.00018) 
0.01074a 
(0.00018) 
Constant 3.08839a 
(0.01210) 
3.10714a 
(0.01209) 
3.12898a 
(0.01211) 
3.00232a 
(0.01249) 
3.00543a 
(0.01256) 
3.00580a 
(0.01256) 
Adjusted R² 0.5888 0.6004 0.6018 0.6021 0.6041 0.6041 
N 137 211 137 211 137 211 137 211 137 211 137 211 
Notes:  1: LBW= Learning by watching 
            2: LSO= Learning from Self and Others 
 
                                                          
7 For tables 2 to 7, standard errors are in parentheses and a, b and c mean respectively statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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underestimates the speed with which individuals learn from others, as we have just seen; but, 
on the other hand, it greatly overestimates the potential for learning from others. 
 
Table 3 reports that a worker can learn 10% of her initial human capital on average 
from one establishment, while the estimate derived from the LBW model is 45%. Table 2 also 
indicates that the relative distance which separates the average worker from her most qualified 
teacher (βz) is equal to 0.26 in terms of educational capital and 0.21 in terms of former 
experience capital. These two values are well inside the [0,1] interval and considerably lower 
than their LBW counterparts. βs declines from 0.38 to 0.26, and βx from 0.95 to 0.21 between 
columns 4 and 5 in table 2. The omission of self-learning has the mechanical effect of raising 
the estimated value of Hij0/hi0, hence of the β parameters. 
 
Table 3: Knowledge diffusion and relative knowledge 
 
 n (%)  t0.50 t0.95 Hij0/hi0 
LSO 45.22  1.93 8.37 1.10 
(0.0001) 
LBW 5.75 12.38 53.53 1.45 
(0.0005) 
 
The Mincerian earnings function is a convenient tool for estimating the average 
returns to education and market experience. The return to education is then simply given by 
the coefficient of the length of schooling. The estimates drawn from the quadratic model are 
reported in table 4 and compared with those from the LSO equation in table 2. The marginal 
return to education (computed at the average length of schooling in the sample) is only 4.61% 
instead of 5.28% for the Mincerian model. Moreover, it decreases with the length of education 
in our model because, the more education, the less can be learned from others. The fact that 
investments in education and learning from others are substitutes has generally been 
overlooked in previous studies which emphasized the complementarity of education and self-
learning8. In contrast, these two effects are present here.  
                                                          
8 The more educated workers receive more formal training (eg. Destré, Lévy-Garboua and Sollogoub 1999) and 
learn more by themselves informally (see eq. (1)). However, when we tested the hypothesis that education 
increase the individual’s ability to learn from others on-the-job n, but could not find any significant positive 
effect. 
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Table 4: Marginal returns to education and former experience 
 
 Mincerian 
Quadratic in t 
LSO 
i
ijt
s
h
∂
∂ log
 
5.28 
 
4.61 
 
i
ijt
x
h
∂
∂ log
 
0.62 
 
0.73 
 
 
B. Firm’s knowledge and the returns to tenure 
 
Table 5 and Figure 1 show the schedule of gross marginal rates of return to tenure 
which derives from the present model of on-the-job learning (computed from equation  (9)) 
and compare the latter with estimates drawn from two Mincerian earnings functions 
(quadratic and quartic in tenure). 
 
The marginal rate of return, computed for the sample's mean tenure, is equal to 1.22%, 
which is significantly positive and greater than the constant rate of return to self-learning on-
the-job9, g=1.07%. The difference of 0.15% measures the average increase which can be 
attributed to learning-by-watching. Thus nearly 12% of what is learned informally on-the-job 
emanates from others and 88% is the result of self-learning. However, the respective shares of 
these two kinds of learning are very unequally distributed over time. While the rate of return 
from self-learning remains constant, the benefits from imitating others are mainly reaped by 
workers shortly after being hired and they are very large then. For instance, table 5 shows that 
earnings rise by 4.50% in the first year of tenure and only 1.78% in the fifth year. Learning-
by-watching accounts for three-quarters of the marginal rate of return in the first year, but this 
proportion falls to 49% in the fifth year and so on. The rate of return estimated by the present 
model is significantly higher (by a t-test of Student) than what is predicted by the quadratic 
earnings function both at low and very high tenure. Figure 1 shows that a quartic function of 
tenure fits our model fairly well as long as tenure does not exceed 30 years or so. However, 
the rates of return predicted by the LSO equation are slightly higher than the quartic in the 
first two years but decline more sharply.  
                                                          
9 This parameter should mainly capture returns to informal training since we control for the average number of 
hours of formal training in the establishment over the last year by occupational group (in two broad categories). 
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Table 5: Schedule of marginal rates of return to tenure (%) for selected years of tenure10 
 
Model Mincerian  
Quadratic in t 
Mincerian  
Quartic in t 
LSO 
First year of tenure 1.98 3.74 4.50a  
(0.0046) 
Second year of tenure 1.94 3.29 3.35a  
(0.0030) 
Third year of tenure 1.89 2.88 2.60a 
(0.0019) 
Fourth year of tenure 1.84 2.52 2.11a  
(0.0013) 
Fifth year of tenure 1.80 2.21 1.78a  
(0.0009) 
Mean tenure  1.61 1.32 1.22a  
(0.0001) 
 
Figure 1: Schedules of marginal rates of return to tenure for three earnings functions 
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10 For tables 5 to 7, the number of observations is 119 667 since the returns to tenure are only defined for t≥1. 
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C. Matching workers with jobs and firms  
 
The present model of on-the-job learning in combination with the matched employer-
employee data that we use enables us to compute the individual-specific relative knowledge 
of the establishment. Although the average relative knowledge of firms, Hij0/hi0, is estimated 
to be 1.10 (see Table 3), which is significantly different from one (by a t-test), there is 
substantial heterogeneity between jobs and firms. The distribution of relative knowledge has a 
mode at 1.0512 and a median which is very close to the mean around 1.10. Mainly for 
illustration purposes, jobs with a low potential for learning will be defined as those offering 
no more than the modal opportunities for learning on-the-job, i.e. λij≤1.0512. Since little can 
be learned on these jobs, the schedule of marginal rates of return to tenure must be low, and 
so effective tenure must be low as well. The description of jobs having a low potential for 
learning is somewhat similar to that of jobs belonging to the “secondary sector” of the dual 
theory of labor (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Dickens and Lang 1985). By contrast, all other 
jobs are similar to jobs of the “primary sector”. Table 6 shows the average and marginal 
returns to tenure (calculated in the mean point of tenure, see table 1), relative knowledge and 
effective tenure in jobs of the secondary and primary types. The average rate of return is given 
for a five-years tenure which fits the observed durations in both types of job. The average 
worker in primary jobs can learn 12% of her initial human capital and has 11.51 years of 
tenure while the average worker in secondary jobs can only learn 3% and only has 5.44 years 
of tenure. Thus tenure is considerably lower in secondary type-jobs than in primary-type jobs 
and the difference is found highly significant by a t-test. The correlations between firm’s 
relative knowledge and tenure, or primary type-job (a dummy) and tenure, are both positive 
and highly significant (by a t-test) with values of 0.382 and 0.246 respectively. The potential 
for learning is definitely a major determinant of job stability and this conclusion does not 
depend on the knowledge being firm-specific as commonly assumed by human capital theory 
(Becker 1964; but see Rosen 1972). The average rate of return to tenure at five years is also 
markedly lower (by a t-test) in secondary-type jobs, i.e. 8.14% versus 14.50%. Finally, the 
difference in marginal rates of return Rijt in the primary and secondary-type jobs is positive by 
a difference t-test. Job competition is expected to equalize the marginal rates of return 
between jobs, while job rationing in the primary sector would cause marginal rates of returns 
to be higher in the rationed segment of the job market. Column 3 compares the marginal 
returns to tenure in the primary-type and secondary-type jobs (computed at the average tenure 
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of sector). Secondary jobs do not appear less profitable than primary jobs on the margin. 
Therefore, our results do not support the job rationing hypothesis of dual labor market.  
 
Table 6: Returns to tenure (%) and the dual labor market accross jobs  
at the individual job's level 
 
 
5ijR  ( )tRij  ( )
2,1=s
tR sij
 
Hij0/hi0 tij 
Secondary 
jobs 
8.14a 
(0.0071) 
1.13a 
(0.0001) 
1.28a 
(5.62e-04) 
1.03 
(0.0001) 
5.44 
(0.0393) 
Primary  
jobs  
14.50a 
(0.0103) 
1.24a 
(0.0001) 
1.14a 
(7.15e-05) 
1.12 
(0.0001) 
11.51 
(0.0276) 
Total 13.58a 
(0.0109) 
1.22a 
(0.0001) 
- 1.10 
(0.0001) 
10.63 
(0.0250) 
 
The foregoing analysis applies to jobs, that is to specific employer-employee matches. 
Do the same conclusions hold when jobs are aggregated at the establishment level? This 
question deserves to be raised because the dual theory of labor was originally set at the firm’s 
level (Doeringer and Piore 1971) and disaggregated data are often lacking below the firm’s or 
establishment’s level. Therefore we now calculate the mean relative knowledge on the sample 
of workers in each establishment and draw the frequency distribution of this mean across 
establishments. The mode of this new distribution is 1.0710 while the mean and median are 
around 1.08. Firms with a low potential for learning on average will be defined as those for 
which the mean relative knowledge does not exceed 1.0710, and will be said to form the 
“secondary sector”. Table 7 extends the information displayed by table 6 at the 
establishment's level, and exactly the same conclusions can be reached. However, when we 
have a closer look at the employer-employee matches, the picture is partly modified by the 
aggregation. While education has a significantly negative (by a t-test) correlation (-0.293) 
with firm’s relative knowledge at the job’s level, the correlation turns significantly positive 
(by a t-test) and small (0.031) at the establishment’s level. The rationale behind this surprising 
result is that more educated individuals choose firms offering greater opportunities for 
learning because they are willing to invest more in training; but, since they know more, they 
eventually have less to learn from others. Moreover, the aggregation greatly magnifies the 
positive correlation of the potential for learning (measured by relative knowledge) with 
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observed earnings: it rises from -0.016 to 0.173 (statistically significant by a t-test). Thus 
predictions of the dual theory of labor regarding the employer-employee match which are 
visible at the establishment’s level seem to vanish at the individual job’s level. Other 
implications of dual labor theory are also captured by our simple typology of sectors. For 
instance, 50% of workers employed in primary-type jobs versus only 14% of workers in 
secondary-type jobs belong to establishments which have trade union representatives. 
Besides, 33% of primary-type establishments have trade union representatives versus 12% of 
secondary-type establishments.  
 
Table 7: Returns to tenure (%) and the dual labor market accross jobs 
at the establishment's level 
 
 Mean 5ijR  
by 
establishment 
Mean ( )tRij  
by 
establishment
Mean 
( )
2,1
 
=s
tR sij
 
by 
establishment
Mean 
(Hij0/hi0)  
by 
establishment 
Mean (tij)  
by 
establishment
Secondary 
sector 
9.06a 
(0.0162) 
1.63a 
(0.0055) 
1,24a 
(8.34e-04) 
1.04 
(0.0002) 
6.54 
(0.0721) 
Primary 
sector  
13.61a 
(0.0233) 
1.85a 
(0.0068) 
1,17a 
(2.80e-04) 
1.11 
(0.0003) 
10.64 
(0.0552) 
Total 11.88a 
(0,0241) 
1.76a 
(0.0048) 
- 1.08 
(0.0003) 
9.08 
(0.0468) 
 
 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have suggested a simple model of informal learning on-the-job which combines 
self-learning and learning from others. This yields a closed-form solution that revises the 
Mincer-Jovanovic’s (1981) treatment of tenure in the human capital earnings function by 
relating earnings to the individual’s job-specific learning potential. We estimated the 
structural parameters of this non-linear model on a large French survey with matched 
employer-employee data. We find that workers on average can learn from others ten percent 
of their own human capital on entering the firm, and catch half of their learning potential in 
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just two years. Since individuals learn fast from their co-workers, the estimated returns to 
tenure loom larger than predicted by a quadratic, or even a quartic-in-tenure, Mincerian 
function in the first years and decline more sharply (until about thirty years). Learning by 
watching accounts for three quarters of the marginal rate of return in the first year of tenure, 
but this share falls rapidly, with an average of 12%. While education and self-learning on-the-
job are complementary, education and learning from others on-the-job are substitutes. The 
more education, the less can be learned from others. This forces the marginal return curve to 
decline slightly with education, an effect which was not captured by current theory. The 
measurement of workers’ job-specific learning potential provides a simple and novel 
characterization of primary-type and secondary-type jobs and establishments. With the latter, 
it is possible to revisit the dual labor market theory. We find a strong relationship between the 
job-specific learning potential and tenure. We suggest that the opportunity of learning much 
from co-workers is an essential feature of primary-type jobs and firms. However, a closer 
look at data shows, with this definition at least, that primary-type jobs are not rationed. 
Furthermore, predictions of the dual labor theory regarding the positive match of primary-type 
firms (which offer high learning opportunities) with highly endowed workers (educated, high 
wages) are visible at the establishment's level but seem to vanish at the job's level.  
 
The LSO (Learning from Self and Others) earnings function estimated here is non-
linear and thus could not be estimated by a standard OLS regression. However, it might be 
linearized for the ease of estimation, if one is not interested in recovering the structural 
parameters, by means of a Taylor expansion of its non-linear part at the second, or a higher, 
order. Future research may also adopt more convenient specifications for the job-specific 
learning potential and this is certainly an area where important progress can be made. Our 
paper can be seen as a preliminary attempt to adapt the Mincerian earnings function to 
matched employer-employee data.  
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